East Central European Economic Transition and the West by Réti, Tamás
Macalester International
Volume 2 Transition and Globalization in Central and
Eastern Europe Article 9
Fall 12-31-1995
East Central European Economic Transition and
the West
Tamás Réti
Budapest University of Economic Sciences
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Réti, Tamás (1995) "East Central European Economic Transition and the West," Macalester International: Vol. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol2/iss1/9
EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
TRANSITION AND THE WEST
Tamás Réti
I. Introduction
It has now been several years since the first countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) embarked on their transition to mar-
ket economies. This transformation has proved to be an
unprecedented task and a special challenge since there has been
no clear and detailed map to guide the way. This paper shows
the most general macroeconomic problems of the four success-
fully reforming countries — the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovenia — and the economic situation of war-dev-
astated Yugoslavia. It then focuses on the changes in foreign
economic relations and presents the relationship with the most
important trading partner, the European Community (EC).
In 1995, the state of the CEE economies remains diversified.
Market reforms and stabilization efforts have proceeded at vari-
ous speeds, achieving varying degrees of success. Population
support for rapid market reforms has gradually dwindled, and
the social costs of the transition are likely to gain importance in
policy decisions. The role of geographical position, that is, the
distance from developed market economies, plays a decisive
function and reflects the continuity of some old traditions.
II. Stabilization and Liberalization Measures
At the onset of the transition, these economies had to face some
major tasks, namely, (a) going through a process of macroeco-
nomic stabilization, both external and domestic; (b) implement-
ing economic liberalization measures; and (c) introducing major
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institutional changes (e.g., the decrease of state involvement in
the economy, beginning with property changes, and the emer-
gence of a new private sector). All these measures have corre-
sponded to the so-called Washington consensus, to the recipe
suggested by the G-7 countries, and, above all, to the Washing-
ton-based international monetary organizations — the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
The legacy of the Soviet-style economic system was devastat-
ing, producing both hidden and open inflation, monetary over-
hang, excess demand, fiscal deficit, a situation of acute shortage,
and a foreign debt crisis created by inefficient and internation-
ally noncompetitive, backward economies. By 1989, it became
clear that the socialist experiment had failed; the communist
elite was demoralized, and at least a part of this elite determined
that it was in its own economic interest not to oppose the radical
change to capitalism and democracy.1
After holding the first free parliamentary elections, new gov-
ernments had to select appropriate reform strategies for their
nations’ conditions. They had to choose a proper pace of stabi-
lization and liberalization measures, that is, between a gradual-
ist/evolutionary approach and shock therapy/big bang.2
As a result of these changes, a “shortage economy” has been
transformed into a “demand-constrained economy” — a major
achievement. A common outcome of both the gradualist or the
shock therapy approach was a huge decrease in output in each
country between 1989 and 1993. The recession that followed has
been compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s in the
United States — only worse. The reasons for this recession were
multifold. Perhaps the most important was the collapse of
COMECON trade, resulting in a switch to dollar-trade and the
end of bilateral state trading. In addition, an important factor in
the decline was the squeeze on real wages and credit supply,
which negatively affected both consumer demand and the busi-
ness climate. Excessive reductions in aggregate demands and
the absence of government assistance to state firms led to a
decline in output. In the framework of monetary stabilization, a
tight monetary policy reduced government expenditures, and a
restraint on wages had a direct negative impact on the level of
production. Other reasons for the decline were a reduction in
military expenditures and in specific “Soviet-type” areas of
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investment. Both of these reductions meant that decline was
inevitable.3
On the positive side, the progress made in the transition
process by the end of 1993 seemed to have put an end to the
transitional recession. The economic recovery that began in
Poland in 1992 spread to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Slovenia.
A. Poland
Poland was the first transitional economy to break out of a
recession. The Polish shock therapy that resulted in hyperinfla-
tion introduced the zloty’s internal convertibility, increased
external credit-worthiness, and restored external balance.
Although the father of the economic program — Leszek Bal-
cerowicz, the Polish Minister of Finance — did not politically
survive the first completely free parliamentary election in Octo-
ber 1991, the successive rightist and leftist governments did not
make a break with the logic of his original program.4
Prior to 1990, increasing the use of hard currency to finance
domestic transactions was restraining the government’s ability
to conduct its macroeconomic policy. The share of zloty-denom-
inated money in the total money supply was only 41 percent in
December 1989; this ratio increased to 75 percent by the end of
1991. Polish inflation continued its decline from the triple-digit
rates recorded during 1989 and 1990 to 35 percent by 1993. The
combination of moderate inflation and beginning recovery
forced the Warsaw stock market into action; it recorded a boom
in 1993. The boom was in connection with the fact that much of
the capital inflow into Poland came as portfolio investments.
The dynamic growth of the private sector has compensated for
the fall in output resulting from the disappearance of loss-mak-
ing enterprises in the state sector. The Suchocka government
held a firm policy line against excessive wage demands and
defended a budgetary stance in line with the IMF’s recommen-
dations. As a result of the tight monetary and fiscal policies,
great social tensions developed. By autumn of 1994, social pres-
sures and political dissatisfaction led to a shift from a middle-
right to a leftist socialist-dominated coalition government.
Tamás Réti
55
12/20/95  06:58 AM      1870ret2.qxd
In 1993 and 1994, the economy produced an impressive
growth fueled by a strong export performance and increasing
domestic demand, consumption and investment. The role of
imports has been considerable in supporting domestic recovery,
leading to a strong imbalance in foreign trade. However, the
Consumer Price Index appears to be under control, although it
was still very high (32 percent in 1994) compared to other transi-
tion economies. The central government budget deficit is low; in
1994, it was equal to 2.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).
Despite this good result, the government budget is suffering
from structural deficiencies. Financing the growing public debt
is a heavy burden. Unemployment remains high—16 percent at
the end of 1994—and there are strong regional variations in the
unemployment rate. Crisis-struck counties are located in the
northeastern section of Poland, where the rate of unemployment
nears 30 percent.5
It came as some relief that Poland has succeeded in coming to
an agreement with its creditors. Debt was reduced to the Paris
Club in April 1991 and to the London Club in March 1994. This
means that approximately one-half of Poland’s foreign debt was
forgiven. The most important consequence of debt reduction is
that Poland becomes once again a fully rehabilitated member of
the international finance community, which, in turn, opens the
way to new borrowing on easier terms. The London Club settle-
ment improves its credit-worthiness as well as increasing
investors’ confidence. This is extremely important since (a) eco-
nomic recovery requires new investment and (b) the trade bal-
ance is already stretched. However, as a result of this debt
reduction, Polish payment obligations will increase over time,
including both interest payments and amortization. An immedi-
ate impact has been a deterioration in the current account and
an increased inflow of capital in the form of new credits. Debt
reduction was strongly interrelated with the positive assessment
of the IMF. Constraints in economic policy have been imposed
by IMF conditionality.6
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B. Hungary
In contrast with the Polish model, the Hungarian economy
chose a gradualist program in 1990. The reason for this choice
was the lower level of destabilization in Hungary than in
Poland. In addition, there existed among the Hungarian econo-
mists a disbelief in any “great leap forward” and suspicions
about shock therapy. Hungarian economic reforms have been
taking place since 1968 without achieving a market economy,
which has resulted in a so-called reform trap. Although Hungar-
ian business leaders and other agents of the economy have had
experience with a more open business-oriented system and eco-
nomic liberalization since the 1980s, they rejected radical
changes such as a sharp devaluation, a freeze on wage increases,
and full liberalization of prices. Whether the Hungarian econ-
omy has been better suited to transition as a consequence of
these limited but early reforms is doubtful.7
The limits of gradualist economic policy, given the loss of
Soviet markets and debt service payments, made austerity mea-
sures necessary. Declining agricultural subsidies, rapidly grow-
ing import competition, and long-lasting uncertainty in
ownership changes have been the primary factors behind the
heavy decline in output. Despite governmental intentions for a
slow and peaceful transition without dramatic hardships, as for-
eign demand collapsed, domestic demand had to be severely
cut. The outcome of this coincidence in 1991 was the biggest
drop in the GDP (11.9 percent) in Hungarian history. However,
there were some signs of improvement during the following
year. Inflation slowed to 23 percent (as projected), the popula-
tion savings ratio increased to 14 or 15 percent of household
incomes, the current account reported a surplus, and the decline
in output slowed down.
In order to accelerate positive changes, the government
attempted to initiate a forced recovery; consequently, the mone-
tary policy was artificially loosened and the fiscal deficit went
out of control. By 1993, output decline continued, although it
was already marginal. As a result of the growing fiscal deficit,
tensions with the IMF finally suspended the disbursement of the
next tranche due under the three-year credit agreement.
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One structural problem was connected to the very low level
of capital investments, which resulted in a 22-percent real drop
in investments between 1990 and 1993. The reason for invest-
ment shrinkage can be found in the limited and very expensive
credit resources available from state-owned commercial banks
who still control much of the banking.8
The second difficulty occurred in the external sector. Current
dollar exports declined by 17 percent in 1993 while imports
grew by 13 percent. A $3.5 billion deficit in the current account
emerged not as a sign of an impending economic upturn, but
rather as a consequence of export decline. The current account
deficit affected the country’s credit rating negatively and
increased borrowing costs of new credits.
A third structural problem was the privatization of state
assets. The Hungarian model of privatization has been fairly
similar to the Polish one. In both countries, there has been a mix
of centralized and decentralized privatization that gives prefer-
ence to sale for a real money cost in contrast to asset distribution
at no cost. By early 1994, the fourth consecutive year of owner-
ship changes, only 30 percent of the originally state-owned
property had been privatized, another 20 percent had disap-
peared through liquidation, an additional 30 percent would
have yet to face privatization, and 20 percent remained in long-
term state ownership. Thus, 50 percent of the economy was
state-owned and only 30 percent privatized. However, priva-
tized firms and the genuine private sector produced more than
half of the GDP and employed 40 percent of the labor force.
By 1994, economic recovery in Hungary was stronger than
had been expected. According to preliminary official figures,
growth remained at about 2 percent. Also, there was a strong
increase in industrial output, exports, and investments. How-
ever, the size of external and internal imbalances was higher
than had been thought, and the country, as in 1993, consumed
about 9 percent more than it produced, thereby increasing its
foreign indebtedness. These trends are obviously unsustainable.
Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank—who, in September 1994, expressed concern about
the country’s economic performance, particularly the budget
deficit and the level of public spending — the new socialist-lib-
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eral government was forced to adopt a harsh austerity program
in March of 1995.
The IMF insisted that the country slim down its generous sys-
tem of social welfare provision, specifically, the child care sys-
tem, early retirement schemes, unemployment benefits for those
who do not finish school, and health care expenses. All of these
actions were included in the austerity package elaborated on by
the new minister of finance in early March of 1995. So far in
1995, the government and the IMF have failed to reach an agree-
ment on a new standby loan. The government has to address
simultaneously the deficit on the current account and the fiscal
deficit.9
A worrisome trend is that unemployment has continued on a
downward course while inflation has risen. The rate of unem-
ployment was 10.6 percent at the end of 1994. Acceleration of
restructuring, originating from tightened macroeconomic condi-
tions, is likely to push up the unemployment rate in 1995. Year-
on-year inflation slowed down to 19 percent in 1994. As a result
of strong devaluation, the introduction of an import tax, and
various central price adjustment measures, inflation began to
accelerate and may surpass 30 percent in 1995.
C. The Czech Republic
So far, the stability-oriented macroeconomic policy seems to be
staying on track in the Czech Republic. On January 1, 1991, the
Czechoslovak government launched a major set of reforms that
consisted of liberalizing some prices, sharply devaluing the
koruna and linking it to Western currencies, introducing a 20-
percent import surcharge, and controlling the growth of wages.
These radical measures were introduced in the context of a pro-
claimed restrictive monetary and fiscal policy. They were sup-
plemented by a strong push to speed up the privatization
process, attract foreign capital, promote the growth of newly
emerging private firms, decrease government subsidies to firms,
and, generally, reduce the role of the state in the economy. By
applying restrictive macroeconomic policy, the Czechoslovak
government succeeded in rapidly extinguishing the inflationary
pressure brought about by the sudden liberalization of prices.
Tamás Réti
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The ability to eliminate inflation and bring about some price sta-
bility for the next few years was impressive.
From 1991 to 1994, the monetary authorities pursued the goal
of maintaining a stable exchange rate that was strongly under-
valued in relation to its purchasing power parity. On the nega-
tive side, the Czechoslovak economy plunged into a much more
severe recession than was originally expected. In undertaking
tough measures, the government greatly benefited from the
willingness of the population to undergo a painful transition.
The dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation had repercus-
sions on both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, similar to the
dissolution of the COMECON trade links. The establishing of
border controls, the introduction of separate currencies, and the
segmentation of capital markets had a negative effect on trade.
The negative consequences were also evident in a decline of out-
put, employment, and direct foreign investment.
The cornerstone of the Czech economic policy continues to be
voucher privatization. During the first wave (completed in
December 1992), almost 1,500 formerly state-owned firms were
privatized; the second wave offered 846 companies to the pub-
lic. While Poland and Hungary implemented government-man-
aged and decentralized privatization schemes, in the Czech
Republic mass-privatization enjoyed priority — currently,
approximately 80 percent of the economy is at least partially pri-
vatized compared to approximately 30 percent of the Hungarian
economy. The state retains majority stakes through the National
Property Fund in energy, steel, and telecommunications.
While Czech privatization has been broad, there are some
questions regarding its depth. About two-thirds of Czechs par-
ticipating in the mass privatization entrusted their vouchers to
investment funds. The still (indirectly) state-controlled commer-
cial banks manage newly privatized enterprises through their
ownership of investment funds. In fact, the Czech architects of
voucher privatization created banking ownership. The banks
play the dual roles of lender and owner. The separation of their
banking and fund management activities creates problems. It
seems that the dominance of bank-managed investment funds
might be a transitory phase in the privatization process.
Preliminary assessments of the first wave of voucher privati-
zation show that the direct impact of ownership changes has
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been rather small. However, management enjoys more indepen-
dence from the state and works in a fairly stable environment.
Funds set up by the big banks are extremely conservative about
accepting direct responsibility for the running of privatized
firms. Instead, many funds are involved in managing portfolios.
Another part of the problem is that funds are limited to a maxi-
mum 20-percent share in any firm, which prevents them from
gaining control of management.10
The Czech economy has several strong points, the most
important of which are the balanced budget, a surplus in the
current account of the balance of payments, and a constant
exchange rate since 1990. A major advantage of the Czech econ-
omy is a low level of foreign debt, equal to the currency reserves
of the banking sector. The unemployment rate has remained
very low compared to other East European countries despite
permanent reductions in employment. Finally, the inflation rate
is nearing single digits.11
The low rate of registered unemployment is not an asset,
rather it is a liability in the transformation. Skeptics argue that
low unemployment forcefully maintains low wages via regula-
tion and “allows” firms to continue the practice of overemploy-
ment. So far, bankruptcies have been few and limited primarily
to small companies. But many argue that without changes at the
micro level, it is impossible to sustain macroeconomic stability.
It is also true that, prior to the political change in 1989, the pri-
vate sector was almost nonexistent and the service sector under-
developed. The new private industries and service sector have
been able to absorb part of the labor force released by large
industries. However, one has to expect future growth in the pre-
sent unemployment rate if restructuring and modernization in
newly privatized firms really begins.
The current Czech economic policy places a high priority on a
balanced budget even when overall economic activity is low;
however, there have been no radical measures to reduce the size
of the central budget. On the other hand, strengthening the
banking sector by taking over a portion of bad debts was also an
issue of high importance. Various forms of assistance given to
commercial banks have increased the public debt, which was
equal to 18 percent of the GDP at the start of 1994. The debt-to-
GDP ratio has remained constant, and its limited size is an addi-
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tional important asset of the Czech transition. Monetary policy
maintains credit restrictions as a means to battle inflation. The
inflow of foreign currency, in the form of portfolio investments
and loans to businesses, increases the quantity of money. It is
unclear which shares have been sold outside the country, and it
is also unknown whether the major vendors have been private
individuals or investment funds.
One of the most difficult economic issues facing the Czech
government is the bad financial situation of private companies.
In 1990, commercial banks were burdened with a korona (Kc)
126 billion bad debt on loans to private companies. The govern-
ment transferred about Kc 130 billion worth of non-performing
debts from commercial banks to the state’s Konsolidacni Banka
at a discount. In 1993, the government started debt-clearing
operations aimed at reducing the inter-enterprise debts esti-
mated at approximately Kc 160 billion. In most of the cases, the
reform was a shift from state subsidies to bank loans that are to
be moved to the state-owned Konsolidacni Bank as bad debts.
An outcome of this Czech paternalism in bank debt policy is the
avoidance of both enterprise bankruptcies and the dismissal of
employees. Managers also are unwilling to shed superfluous
labor, but in return they expect wage restraint from the unions.
D. Slovenia
The most developed East European economy, Slovenia, gained
its political independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991. It had
to implement a currency reform in order to introduce its own
monetary policy and to rid itself of the highly inflationary
Yugoslav dinar. The Bank of Slovenia has used a flexible
exchange rate, with the German mark as the main currency of
reference. The introduction of a fixed exchange rate of the new
national currency, the tolar, to the German mark was not feasi-
ble since the country had low foreign reserves and high infla-
tion. The economy has suffered from sharp external shocks such
as the loss of the former Yugoslav markets and the interruption
of transport and infrastructural links. As a result of the Yugoslav
war, sanctions by the United Nations also negatively affected its
economy. In order to fight high inflation, a very restrictive mon-
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etary policy has been employed, resulting in a shortage of
tolars.12
The highly export-oriented economy has managed to make
up for the loss of markets in the former Yugoslavia by shifting
its trade to markets in the European Union (EU). Revival in
Western Europe in 1994 revitalized its foreign trade perfor-
mance. The share of exports and imports compared to the GDP
exceeded 112 percent of the GDP in 1994 — a clear indication of
its openness. The combined effect of increased exports with a
growth in tourism and other service revenues has led to a fast
rise in foreign exchange reserves, which, in turn, created an
upward pressure on the tolar. The buildup of foreign reserves
was also achieved through privatization of publicly owned flats.
In addition, it was an advantage that the country inherited a
comfortable budgetary position. Cuts in transfers to the former
federal authorities saved an important part of its traditional cur-
rent budgetary expenditures.
The economy has been growing since the postindependence
recession bottomed out in mid-1993. The economy showed
dynamic growth throughout 1994; this will probably continue in
1995. The GDP rose from 1.3 percent in 1993 to 5 percent in 1994.
The upswing in production was backed by increased domestic
demand as well as the solid performance of investments and
exports. Investments grew at a much more rapid pace than in
the previous year: gross fixed capital investments in real terms
rose from 15 percent in 1993 to 20 percent in 1994. The central
government’s budget remained balanced. Besides the moder-
ately restrictive monetary policy, the real appreciation of the
tolar continued to be an important instrument for driving back
inflation. Although the pace of growth in the economy was
faster than anticipated, consumer prices slowed down, so the
annual rise in retail prices dropped from 32.3 percent in 1993 to
19.8 percent in 1994.
In spite of the tolar’s real appreciation, there has been a fast
growth in exports, which reached $6.8 billion, while imports
came to $7.2 billion. Thanks to favorable developments in
tourism and low foreign debt service obligation, Slovenia
achieved a surplus in the current account at $478 million in 1994
from $150 million in 1993. Low foreign debt — Slovenia’s being
$2.3 billion at the end of 1994 — is another major asset in the
Tamás Réti
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transformation process.13 In 1995, the main goal of monetary pol-
icy will continue to be the lowering of inflation and the reduc-
tion of very high real interest rates. It is open to question
whether Slovenia will be able to sustain export-led growth and
implement some form of income restraint together with struc-
tural reforms.
Behind the surface picture of a strongly growing economy
with financial stability lie substantial unresolved problems. A
significant problem is the high level of government expenditure
and taxation, which is approximately 49 percent of the GDP.
These expenditures and taxes were the basis for major com-
plaints by the business sector. The transformation of socially
owned enterprises into private ones has difficulties. Privatiza-
tion means, in most cases, a form of management or worker
buyout. As a consequence, managers of private enterprises have
been unable to resist demands for higher wages and are unwill-
ing to invest. High wages, coupled with high government
spending, lead to the decapitalization of firms, a loss of competi-
tiveness in their exports, and a further squeeze on employment.
In March 1995, negotiations were under way for the first nation-
al agreement between social partners (i.e., the government,
employers, and employees) that aimed at serious wage restric-
tion in order to decrease inflation and augment competitiveness.
E. Yugoslavia
The economic stabilization program in the small republics of the
former Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro) shows a contra-
dictory picture of the Yugoslavian economy. Dragoslav
Avramovich, the governor of the National Bank, instituted anti-
inflationary methods. The Avramovich Program rested on two
main cornerstones: (a) linking the dinar convertibility to the
German mark and (b) the Yugoslav National bank regulation
attaching the issue of primary money to foreign currency and
gold backing.
These measures resulted in the liquidation of hyperinflation,
an end to shortages of goods, increases in the previously low
levels of production, and an increased confidence in the national
currency on the part of the general population as well as compa-
nies putting their stocks on the market. Of the methods used to
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counter hyperinflation, it is important to mention that the
Yugoslav National Bank operates as a currency board. The pri-
mary issue of money has to be completely covered by the central
bank’s foreign currency and gold reserves. The new “superdi-
nar” was set up to be convertible on the current account transac-
tions with an exchange rate pegged at a ratio of 1:1 against the
deutsche mark. An important part of the program is to end the
creation of money in order to cover the budget deficit. These
positive trends have not lasted, and since the second half of
1994, financial stabilization has been in danger.14
According to official data, the “social product” (an alternative
barometer of the GNP) in 1994 grew by 6.5 percent, following
the 27.7 percent decline sustained in the previous year. The
social product in 1994 reached 52 percent of its 1990 level. Indus-
trial output in 1994 rose by 1.3 percent, amounting to 42 percent
of the 1990 production level. Within industry, the smallest drop
in output came from energy suppliers. In contrast, iron metal-
lurgy slumped to 18 percent of its earlier level, manufacturing of
transportation vehicles to 16 percent, and the machine-building
industry to 21 percent. On the other hand, the very low output
level in the rubber, shipping, textile, construction materials, and
electrical machine industries showed a sharp growth beginning
in 1994.
Official Yugoslav government statistics contradict the govern-
ment’s own statements on inflation. According to official statis-
tics, consumer prices did not rise after the introduction of the
anti-inflation program on January 24, 1994. However, by Febru-
ary, price increases were very high, and in the fourth quarter of
1994, new price rises took place. Deflation lasted from March
until August, and the monthly pace of price reductions
remained between 0 and 1 percent. Central price regulations
came into force in several important areas, such as public ser-
vices, pharmaceuticals, products with high import content, and
excise products. Centrally regulated wage policy is applied to
state-owned companies, and the partial payment in kind —
introduced during the period of hyperinflation — has been dis-
continued. However, price increases have continued — in Octo-
ber they grew by 1.4 percent, in November by 7 percent, and in
December by 2 percent. The latter did not include the 71.6-per-
cent rise in domestic electricity prices for households. By the
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first quarter of 1995, retail prices grew by 16.9 percent compared
to December 1994. The above-mentioned figures contradict the
government’s statement that from March to December 1994,
there was zero inflation. The officially published growth in
social product also becomes questionable, as figures were,
indeed, based on zero inflation.
The average wage level is still abominably low, although net
annual earnings during 1994 increased rapidly, rising to 283
dinars in December. However, since the increase in retail prices
was even lower, the real earnings of the population started to
expand. In addition, workers receive some of their food at their
workplace through trade unions. This is an important benefit
since prices there are cheaper than in the marketplace. Never-
theless, many people have been forced to sell their foreign cur-
rency savings.
By 1994, the government was forced to give up both basic
principles of the Avramovich Program — the convertible link
between the dinar and the German mark and the link between
the issue of money to foreign currency and gold backing. How-
ever, after reaching price stabilization by the spring of 1994, the
government attempted to promote an upswing in the economy.
In order to revive production, it increased credit lending with
the Yugoslav National Bank’s relaxed credit policy. Earnings
began to rise since a significant part of the credits were used for
salaries that had fallen behind. Following the revival in domes-
tic demand, money supply was also increased, but the central
bank’s foreign exchange reserves could not keep pace with this
increase. Growth in production and inflow of large quantities of
smuggled goods extended demand in foreign currencies. On the
free market, the German mark exchange rate had already risen
to 1.2 dinars in June 1994, growing to 1.7 to 1.8 dinars by the end
of the year. Devaluation has continued; in February 1995, the
mark was (unofficially) worth 2 dinars. The internal convertibil-
ity of the dinar was discontinued from the middle of 1994, and
the government stopped speaking about foreign currency bank-
ing of the dinar. As a result of the rapid growth in production
costs, the price of basic consumer goods increased, although
salaries slowed down. The result was an explosion of social ten-
sions in the form of strikes. The government attempted to mod-
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erate this strained situation by printing money. All these factors
put financial stabilization at risk by the end of 1994.
A modification of the Avramovich Program was announced
in December 1994, a main element of which was a restriction of
monetary and fiscal policies. Under this policy, in the first quar-
ter of 1995, the government froze salaries and pensions at their
November 1994 level and held credit expansion and money sup-
ply to December 1994 levels. Moreover, they reduced the Feder-
ation and Republic budgetary expenditures by 15 to 25 percent.
In order to slow down the rise in prices, the government called
upon producers to return to the prices of the summer of 1994. In
the modified Avramovich Program, the stabilization of the dinar
and maintenance of its convertibility were no longer mentioned.
The amount of freely exchangeable dinars was restricted to 100,
but even this limited sum was not available in the banks.
Restrictive measures resulted in a 17-percent decline in the
dinar during the first two months of 1995 compared to Decem-
ber 1994, while consumer prices went up by 12.4 percent in Jan-
uary and 1.9 percent in February. The government’s attempts to
restore price levels were not successful. Tight monetary policy
has led to a serious lack of working capital that has affected
almost every branch of the economy. Contrary to the general
restrictions in budgetary expenditures, no cuts are expected in
armament industries. In the interest of limiting imports, the gov-
ernment implemented dramatic import tax increases from 8 to
41.5 percent. There are no official data available regarding the
performance of foreign trade or foreign currency reserves in the
banking sector since publication of public data ceased in April
of 1993, the same time the harsh international embargo mea-
sures were put into effect.
The use of nonmarket, state-distributive methods signified
that a growing part of the economy has been managed by the
state bureaucracy. The Milosevich leadership has been trying to
make the population believe that sanctions are soon to be lifted.
The new dinar stabilization package, which was initiated in Jan-
uary 1994, was based on low levels of production and standard
of living. However, it became clear that the stabilization of the
dinar and the functioning of the central bank as a currency
board were incompatible with both the widespread black mar-
ket and the need for growth and restoration in the economy.
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Without foreign financial support and with the current interna-
tional blockade, the revival of the Yugoslav economy from the
bottom up cannot be successful. Economic revival also depends
on whether or not it will be possible to release the Yugoslav
international currency reserves currently frozen in foreign
banks. The country remains a constant source of instability in
Eastern Europe.15
III. Opening up to the West
Important to the transformation process has been an opening up
to the West. The prospects for macroeconomic stabilizations are
largely dependent on trade relations, foreign debt servicing,
direct foreign investments, and the influx of new loans from the
West. There is widespread agreement that the success of this
transition rests on the ability of these former communist coun-
tries to become full-fledged participants in the world economy.
Therefore, economic relations with the Western industrial coun-
tries have become a matter of great importance. Because of the
collapse in the former COMECON trade in 1990, CEE countries
suffered a deep recession. Western trade became a major source
for economic growth. Simultaneously, the liberalization of trade
put pressure on domestic enterprises by way of foreign competi-
tion.16
Although all countries in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have introduced trade
liberalization programs since 1989, the steps taken by the Euro-
pean Community have been the most comprehensive. Prior to
the political changes of 1989, Central and Eastern Europe had
faced considerable trade barriers. Their exports were subject to
quantitative restrictions. In addition, they could not benefit from
the General System of Preferences (GSP), which were one-sided
preferences for commodities granted to less-developed coun-
tries by the highly developed market economies. In 1989, CEE
foreign trade with the European Community (EC) was between
20 and 35 percent. As a result of the political systemic changes
that occurred from 1988 to 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe,
their most important Western partner, the European Commu-
nity, reacted quickly. The EC immediately began promoting
political and economic reforms in the CEE countries. As a result,
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trade and cooperation agreements have been established
between the EC and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and the former USSR. In the framework of
these agreements, the European Community provided its part-
ners with the General System of Preferences, which meant elim-
inating a number of quantitative restrictions and reducing
barriers with regard to so-called sensitive goods, such as textiles
and steel products. In the case of agriculture, EC trade conces-
sions were rather limited. The major problem with the GSP was
that the EC could revoke them at any time it desired.
The next more developed step of the relationship between the
European Community and the individual countries has been the
conclusion of the Association Agreements. The agreements,
which also contain sections on political dialogue and institu-
tional provisions, aim at the establishment of a free trade area by
the end of a ten-year transition period. At the end of 1994, after
the splitting of Czechoslovakia, the six reforming countries —
Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia —
have Association Agreements with the EC. On the EC side, the
Agreements consolidate all the previous trade concessions,
while laying the groundwork for the complete removal of all
trade obstacles (except agriculture). The European Community
has attempted to eliminate quotas and phase out import tariffs
in a shorter time than the Central and East European countries
are required to reciprocate these concessions. The CEE countries
are not obliged to reciprocate on a cut-for-cut basis. The above
commitments of the EC do not apply to the so-called sensitive
sectors that play an important role in CEE exports.17
An assessment of trade flows suggests that the EC market is
offering a substantial export outlet for the CEE countries. It has
been valuable because it coincided with the collapse of the
Soviet markets. A fast change in the reorientation of trade from
the former COMECON markets has altered the regional compo-
sition of trade radically between 1989 and 1994. As a result,
approximately 40 to 70 percent of CEE foreign trade occurred
with the European Community. This shift has been greatly
affected by the unification of Germany, which now includes the
former East German trade. The expansion of trade with the EC
has, in part, been a genuine success. The six countries’ market
share in the EC external imports from abroad rose dramatically;
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however, it still remained comparatively low. In 1994, only 5
percent of total EC imports originated from those states that
enjoy partnership agreements. For example, Sweden, which has
a population of less than 9 million, exports about as much to the
EC as the six CEE countries, which have a combined population
of approximately 90 million. On the other hand, the small coun-
tries have achieved some competitive gains, meaning that CEE
exports to the European Community grew faster than non-EC
competitors. The combined market share of the so-called Viseg-
rad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slova-
kia) in certain industries or products, such as cement, clay,
wooden products, and metal products, is extremely high (52
percent, 37 percent, 26 percent, and 24 percent, respectively). All
of these statistics show that, with the exception of a few prod-
ucts, CEE export is marginal, and, in addition, it is rather sensi-
tive to the general economic climate in the West. If a recession
occurs, it will have a very negative impact even on this marginal
CEE export performance.18
The export structure of all CEE countries is fairly similar,
although there are some important differences. For instance, the
share of agriculture and food is higher in the Hungarian and
Polish export, and the ratio of iron and steel is bigger in the
Czech export. Despite the Association Agreements, which are,
in principle, liberalizing the Western market faster than is
required for CEE countries, there was a growing imbalance dur-
ing the 1993–1994 period. Western exports to the East increased
faster than the Eastern exports to the West, resulting in a deteri-
oration in the CEE trade balance. A major role in the compara-
tive advantage of CEE exports is low wage costs.19
Evaluating the initial results of the Association Agreements,
there is some reason for disappointment on the part of the CEE
countries. It now seems clear that the CEE countries had unreal-
istic expectations concerning the amount of assistance coming
from the European Community. Furthermore, it appears that
there is a loss of political momentum; specifically, the EC is not
as interested in Eastern Europe as it was a few years ago. East-
ern Europe no longer represents any political or economic dan-
ger to the West; therefore, postponement of membership in the
European Union seems less risky. The protectionist features of
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the European Community are a major problem for CEE coun-
tries.
Ivan Kocarnik, the Czech Minister of Finance, stated in an
interview, “They [the European Union nations] advise us on lib-
eralizing everything during the transformation process, and
after we have done so, they implement protectionist measures
against our exports.”20 According to another leading Czech
economist, Vladimir Dlouhy, there is a need for economic
reforms in Western Europe that would lead to both the “transfer
of a certain part of production to more competitive conditions in
Central Europe and [to] structural changes.”21 The official Polish
position on concessions is also rather critical. They agree that the
antidumping and safeguard clauses of the EU are wiping out
the benefits from the concessions in tariffs and quotas. The Slo-
vak government’s position emphasizes the importance of the so-
called nontariff protection prevailing in Western Europe. These
nontariff barriers are employed mainly in the case of sensitive
goods (e.g., textiles, clothing, iron and steel, foodstuffs, and agri-
cultural products). This kind of Western protectionism has a
very negative effect by visibly increasing deficits in the CEE
trade balance. This means that the Western exports are increas-
ing faster than their CEE counterparts. Another part of that
problem is connected to the weak protection of the CEE domes-
tic markets. Some economies (e.g., the Hungarian, Polish, and
Slovakian) have been giving a priority in their economic policies
to anti-inflationary measures, which has led to an appreciation
of their local currencies. This revaluation has been detrimental
to export performance, but it constrained the inflationary
growth and simultaneously pushed up Western imports.
On the side of the EU, there is a clear rejection of this CEE crit-
icism. The European Community’s apologists state that their
import policies have been liberal, but the major problem is that
CEE countries are simply uncompetitive. They argue that free
trade is possible between the two regions as fast as the CEE
countries can digest it. However, the EC must admit that there
are special trade regulations in those areas in which Eastern
Europe is more competitive.
This leads us to the question, “Why is there such soft sup-
port?” In answering this, one needs to note that the Association
Agreements may be aimed at unifying the European Union
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trade policy more than at opening its markets. Eastern Europe
has a small share in EU foreign trade, and its economies are
rather limited in size. The weakness of European Union support
can be explained by the small size and uncertainty of CEE mar-
kets. It is also important to mention that, as a consequence of the
collapse of communism, the East went from a political position
of applying pressure to the EU to that of an applicant. It is true
that CEE countries are economically unfit to receive instant
membership, but they need a timetable and a clear-cut set of
requirements or concrete economic performance criteria for the
preparation of accession. The so-called Maastricht criteria —
which include the elimination of subsidies, budgetary disci-
pline, monetary stabilization, and low inflation — cannot fairly
be applied to CEE economies since they are too demanding even
for most of the current EU members. The Copenhagen Summit
of June 1993 was a real step forward in the relationship as it offi-
cially acknowledged that the partners are future members. The
Essen Summit held in December 1994 resulted in a decision to
prepare a White Paper by the summer of 1995 that would pro-
vide some details on the process of joining. When we evaluate
the result of the present Association Agreements, it is important
to note that internal domestic problems are also obstructing the
faster export expansion of the East. The frequent underutiliza-
tion of export quotas are a result of low CEE nonprice competi-
tiveness, which means poor marketing and low product quality.
The enlargement of the EU raises the question of bringing in
the most advanced CEE countries (e.g., the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary) as a group or, more likely, in a
one-by-one accession. The real per capita income is well below
the EU average in all CEE economies with the exception of
Slovenia. Since development occurs at different speeds, political
consideration may influence the EU to let in the more successful
and wealthy reformers. Still, the basic problem is the high cost of
subsidization, which is a serious drain on structural, cohesion,
and common agricultural policy funds. Certainly, full EU mem-
bership is not an issue for every Eastern state, nor is fast mem-
bership likely for even a few. However, all the efforts carried out
thus far seem to be necessary in order to promote the future
integration of the most advanced countries into the European
Union.
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IV. Conclusion
Economic growth has taken a firm hold in the most reform-ori-
ented Eastern countries. The recovery is fueled mainly by export
expansion, although domestic sources of growth — strong
advancement in the private sector and acceleration of personal
consumption — have been equally important. The significant
slow down of inflation emerged regionwide; however, price
increases seem to be resistant in those countries where currency
devaluations, immense budgetary spending, increases in
domestic tax rates, and increased energy prices are contributing
to an upward pressure on prices. Because of these factors, cur-
rent inflation rates are well above those in Western Europe.
Prospects for sustainable growth depend on a solution to such
structural problems as high unemployment, a fragile fiscal bal-
ance, weak asset portfolios of commercial banks, and the poor
financial situation of state firms. Despite the economic upturn,
levels of employment continue to fall; expansion in private sec-
tor employment cannot fully compensate for jobs lost in the
state sector. Inflow of direct foreign investment is still lower
than expected and is likely to remain so. A further tightening of
financial policies in some countries is unavoidable. Reforms in
public spending and restructuring health care and pension sys-
tems, as well as the limitation of other premature social achieve-
ments, are of great concern to each government.
The principle lessons of the transition are not yet final. It
seems that the best results have been achieved when there has
been an unquestioned commitment by policymakers to the
adjustment programs, including a general support from the
population as well. In contrast to fast achievements in the areas
of stabilization and liberalization, structural reforms have pro-
ceeded more slowly. Privatization, enterprise reforms, and fiscal
and financial sector reforms are the tasks most difficult to imple-
ment. Popular support for comprehensive reforms is essential.
The transition from central planning to the market has been
more difficult and more time-consuming than many democratic
governments anticipated. The dilemma is how to speed up eco-
nomic recovery while maintaining political stability; clearly,
these are interconnected and self-strengthening processes. How-
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ever, if this is accomplished, Eastern Europe has a good chance
of integrating itself into the developed market economies.22
Notes
1. Stanislav Gomulka, “Economic and Political Constraints during Transition,”
Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 1 (1994): 89–106
2. Stanley Fischer, “Socialist Economy Reform: Lessons of the First Three
Years,” The American Economic Review (May 1993): 390–95.
3. Jan Winiecki, “East-Central Europe: A Regional Survey—The Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 1993,” Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 5,
(1994): 709–34.
4. Ben Slay, “The Macroeconomics of Transition in Eastern Europe,” Research
Papers, Radio Free Europe 3, no. 1 (7 January 1994).
5. Economic Trends in Eastern Europe 3, nos. 1–3 (1994) and 4, no. 1 (1995).
6. Markus Rodlauer, “The Experience with IMF-Supported Reform Programs
in Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of Comparative Economics 20 (1995): 95–
115.
7. János Kornai, “The Postsocialist Transition and the State: Reflections in the
Light of Hungarian Fiscal Problems,” The American Economic Review 82, no. 2
(May 1992).
8. Economic Intelligence Unit: Czech Republic (fourth quarter 1994).
9. Peter Havlik, “Improved Prospects of Central and Eastern Europe Contrast
with Depression in the CIS,” The Vienna Institute Monthly Report (1995).
10. Financial Times, 19 December 1994.
11. Friedrich Levcik, Zdenek Lukas, and Josef Pöschl, The Czech Economy: At the
Threshold of Take-off. The Vienna Institute, Members’ Seminar (1994).
12. Franjo D. Stiblar, “Slovenia: A Country Study,” East-Central European
Economies In Transition. Study Papers. Joint Economic Committee Congress of
the United States. Washington, D. C. (November 1994).
13. Economic Trends in Eastern Europe 3, nos. 1–3 (1994) and 4, no. 1 (1995).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. International Monetary Fund,World Economic Outlook, a survey by the staff
of the IMF (October 1993).
17. Bettina Agathanos-Mahr, “The Association Agreements between the EC
and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary,” Discussion paper. European
Trade Union Institute, Brussels (1993).
18. Patrick A. Messerlin, “The Association Agreements between the EC and
Central Europe: Trade Liberalization vs. Constitutional Failure,” Acta Oeco-
nomica 45, nos. 1 and 2 (1966): 119–44.
19. Tamás Réti, “The Six and the European Union,” Lecture presented at the
conference “Slovenia’s Inclusion into the European Union,” Bled, Slovenia (10
and 11 December 1993).
Macalester International Vol. 2
74
12/20/95  06:58 AM      1870ret2.qxd
20. Lidové (Prague), 1 October 1993.
21. Hospodarské (Prague), 15 September 1993.
22. For additional information see the following works. Claudia M. Buch, Nor-
bert Funke, Ralph Heinrich, and Martin Raiser, “Overcoming Obstacles to Suc-
cessful Reforms in Economies in Transition,” Kieler Studien (Institut für
Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel. 261. J.C.B. Mohr /Paul Siebeck/ Tübin-
gen); Michael Danderstadt, The EC and Eastern Europe: The Light Is Fading in the
Lighthouse (Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Series Eurokolleg, 1993); Eco-
nomic Intelligence Unit: Poland (first quarter 1995); Stanley Fischer and Alan
Gelb, “The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 5, no. 4 (1991): 91–105; Valtr Komárek, “Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic: a new approach” in Economic Transformation in Central Europe,
Richard Portes, ed., (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the Euro-
pean Communities, 1993: 3 – 105); János Kornai, “The Evolution of Financial
Discipline under the Postsocialist System,” Kyklos 46 (1993): 315 – 36; Joze
Mencinger, “How to Create a Currency? The Experience of Slovenia,” Review
of World Economics 129, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 418-31; Domenico Mario Nuti and
Richard Portes, Central Europe: the Way Forward. Economic Transformation in
Central Europe, Richard Portes, ed., (Luxembourg: European Communities,
1993: 1 – 20); Slovenia Current Economic Trends, Chamber of Economy of Slove-
nia, SKEP Economic Outlook and Policy Services (Ljubljana, February 1995);
David Stark, “Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central
Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 6, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 17 – 54;
United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, Economic
Bulletin for Europe 46 (1994), New York and Geneva; and János Kornai, The
Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1992).
Tamás Réti
75
